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Abstract
This Note will first examine the general purpose of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and
attempt to ascertain the intended meaning of the direct effect clause. It will then compare and con-
trast the Nikkei court’s interpretation of the clause with the interpretations used in the other recent
cases in the Southern District involving Nigerian cement contract disputes. Finally, this Note will
suggest that the approach used in Nikkei is both correct and consistent with congressional intent
as manifested in the legislative history of the Act.
NOTES
THE NIKKEI CASE: TOWARD A MORE UNIFORM
APPLICATION OF THE DIRECT EFFECT CLAUSE
OF THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
INTRODUCTION
In Decor by Nikkei International, Inc. v. Federal Republic of
Nigeria,1 the district court for the Southern District of New York
held that its jurisdiction extended to the Federal Republic of
Nigeria (Nigeria) and the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (Act).2 This holding con-
tradicts two recent decisions in the same district 3 which denied ju-
risdiction under the same provisions of the Act in nearly identical
factual situations. 4
In Nikkei, three New York corporations5 entered into separate
contracts6 with Nigeria in early 19757 for the sale and delivery of
cement. Under the terms of each contract, payment 8 for cement
delivered 9 was to be made by Nigeria 10 through a commercial let-
1. 497 F. Supp. 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
2. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2),
(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1976).
3. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 488 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, No. 78-2395,
slip op. (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 1980).
4. N.Y.L.J., Aug. 25, 1980, at 1, col. 2. See note 75 infra.
5. These are: Decor by Nikkei International, Inc. (Nikkei), East Europe Import-
Export Company, Inc. (East Europe) and Chenax Majesty, Inc. (Chenax).
6. 497 F. Supp. at 895. Both the Nikkei and East Europe contracts Were to be
governed by United States law. Id. at 897. The Chenax contract was to be governed
by Swiss law. Id. All disputes arising under the contracts were to be submitted to ar-
bitration by the International Chamber of Commerce, Paris, France. Id. Nikkei de-
fendants, however, waived their right to such arbitration. Id. at 897 n.2.
7. The Nikkei contract was entered into on Apr. 21, 1975, the East Europe con-
tract on Jan. 28, 1975, and the Chenax contract on Mar. 20, 1975. Id. at 896-97.
8. As a condition for payment, each supplier was required to furnish a perform-
ance bond. Id.
9. The Nikkei and Chenax contracts were for 240,000 metric tons of cement,
plus or minus 10% at seller's option, at $60 per metric ton, for a total purchase price
of $14.4 million, plus or minus 10%. Id. East Europe's contract was similar, but did
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ter of credit." The letter of credit was to be established and made
payable, upon presentation of specified documents, 12 at a bank
designated 13 by the seller beneficiary. 14 Instead of establishing the
not contain the option clause and was for a price of $59.50 per metric ton. Id. at 897.
Each corporation was to commence shipment within 45 days of receipt of its letters
of credit. Id. at 896-97. See note 11 infra and accompanying text.
10. The contracts also provided for demurrage payments (penalties imposed
when loading or unloading a vessel is delayed). These payments were to be
made on the condition that Nigeria be given due notice by cable of the departure
from the port of loading. 497 F. Supp. at 897.
11. Article 5 [of the Uniform Commercial Code] permits of two major types
of letters of credit transactions---sales letters of credit and standby letters of
credit.
The traditional "commercial" or "sales" letter of credit is a device used
to finance or pay for the sale of goods. In this letter of credit transaction, the
"bank or other person issuing the credit" is known as the "issuer"; the
"buyer or other person who cause [sic] an issuer to issue a credit" is known
as the "customer"; and the seller, for whose benefit the letter of credit is is-
sued, is known as the "beneficiary."
Most commonly, the sales letter of credit authorizes the seller to make a
demand for payment or draw a draft against the issuer upon presentation of
certain documents related to the goods referred to in the sales contract. In
general, the documents will include any required import, export, or inspec-
tion certificates, an invoice prepared by the seller, and a negotiable bill of
lading covering the goods shipped by the seller-beneficiary and made out in
favor of the issuer. If the documents presented by the seller-beneficiary
comply with those called for in the letter of credit, the issuer is obligated to
honor the beneficiary's draft or demand for payment. Provided that the doc-
uments do conform, the issuer will present them to its customer, the buyer
in the underlying sales contract, and will be reimbursed. If the documents
do not conform, the issuer must dishonor the seller's draft or demand and re-
turn it together with the documents; a wrongful honor does not entitle the
issuer to reimbursement.
T. QUINN, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE COMMENTARY AND LAW DIGEST, § 5-102
[A][2] (1978) (emphasis in original). See also Note, Letters of Credit: Exploring the
Boundaries of Injunction Against Honor, 4 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 161, 161-62 n.1
(1980). Each letter of credit was to be subject to the Uniform Customs and Practice
Documentary Credits as set forth the International Chamber of Commerce Brochure
No. 222 (1962 Revision). 497 F. Supp. at 898.
12. "A 'documentary draft' or a 'documentary demand for payment' is one
honor of which is conditioned upon the presentation of a document or documents.
'Document' means any paper including document of title, security, invoice, certifi-
cate, notice of default and the like." U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(b). In Nikkei, each seller
was to present invoices, clean on board bills of lading, and insurance certificates. See
497 F. Supp. at 896-97.
13. Nikkei and East Europe selected Citibank (then First National City Bank)
in New York City. Id. The Chenax letter of credit was to be established with
Schroeder, Muenchmeyer, Hengst and Co. in Hamburg, West Germany. Id. at 897.
14. Id. at 896-97. "A 'beneficiary' of a credit is a person who is entitled under
its terms to draw or demand payment." U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(d).
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letters of credit at the designated banks, however, Nigeria estab-
lished individual letters of credit with CBN. 15 Nigeria then ad-
vised 16 plaintiffs of this change through Morgan Guaranty Trust
Company of New York (Morgan), which was also designated by
Nigeria as the new place of payment. 17 Nigeria's actions caused
plaintiffs no immediate difficulty, and each accepted its letter of
credit with CBN despite the non-conformity with the original con-
tract. 18
In August 1975, the Nigerian government placed an embargo
on all shipping into the port of Lagos-Apapa, where delivery of the
cement was to be made. 1 Later, in the fall of that year, Nigeria
committed an anticipatory breach 20 of each of the contracts and let-
ters of credit by unilaterally amending each letter to provide that
all commercial invoices presented for payment "must be certified
by the beneficiaries or their agents." 21
15. 497 F. Supp. 898.
16. "An 'advising bank' is a bank which gives notification of the issuance of a
credit by another bank." U.C.C. § 5-103(1)(e).
17. 497 F. Supp. at 898. Morgan was not, however, a "confirming" bank (one
which "engages either that it will itself honor a credit already issued by another
bank or that such a credit will be honored by the issuer or a third bank." U.C.C. §
5-103(1)(f).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 896. The Nikkei contracts were among the more than seventy agree-
ments entered into by Nigeria in 1975 through the Nigerian Ministry of Defense, as
part of a program to purchase 16 to 18 million metric tons of cement. Id. As a result,
by August 1975, Nigerian ports had become severely congested with ships seeking to
discharge their cargoes. Faced with imminent national economic disaster, and
deeming the presence of hundreds of cement-carrying vessels to be a threat to the
supply of vital consumer goods, the Nigerian government ordered the embargo. Id.
Thereafter, the government of Nigeria "established a negotiating committee which
was responsible for renegotiating the foreign cement contracts and related letters of
credit on behalf of the government and CBN." Id. At least 43 of the more than 70
who met with the committee accepted settlement agreements. Nikkei, East Europe,
and Chenax all declined to renegotiate their contracts. Id.
20. In the Nikkei case:
[d]efendants do not dispute that the suspension of the importation of cement
and the failure to issue certificates to plaintiffs which authorized the com-
mencement of shipping of cement into Nigeria pursuant to these contracts
are sufficient to constitute anticipatory breaches of the three contracts under
section 2-610 [of the Uniform Commercial Code].
Id. at 908.
21. Id. at 899, quoting letters from Morgan to Nikkei. (Sept. 30, 1975). "CBN
had also informed Morgan that it should not make payments for demurrage under
any letter of credit which had been issued regarding any cement contract unless the
documents submitted to Morgan were certified by CBN." Id.
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Early in 1977 plaintiffs' individual causes of action for anticipa-
tory breach of each contract22 and letter of credit23 were consolida-
ted in the Southern District of New York. 24 Nigeria and CBN, in
their answer to plaintiffs' complaint, raised the defense of sovereign
immunity2 5 to the jurisdiction of the United States courts.26 Con-
trary to the earlier decisions in the Southern District involving
similar Nigerian cement contract disputes,2 7 Judge Lawrence W.
Pierce held that the actions of the defendants fell within the scope
. 22. "Each plaintiff seeks to recover the profits it contends it would have earned
in the performance of its contract had the alleged breach not occurred." Id. at 896.
23. Id. Although the Uniform Custom and Practice Documentary Credits
(UCPDC) was to apply to the letters of credit, James Simms, attorney for defendants,
indicated at trial that the UCPDC contained no provision for anticipatory breach of
an irrevocable letter of credit. Instead, U.C.C. § 5-115(2) governed the alleged
breach. Trial minutes at 9-16, 536-41; 497 F. Supp. at 898, 906-07.
24. The three actions were constructively, rather than formally, consolidated. In
the fall of 1977 defendants requested that the claims of East Europe and Chenax be
first transferred to Judge Lawrence W. Pierce, and then consolidated with Nikkei's
claim, which was already before Judge Pierce. By an order dated February 27, 1978
the motion to transfer was granted and the motion to consolidate was referred to
Magistrate Sol Schreiber. Magistrate Schreiber's subsequent recommendation con-
cerned itself with the jurisdictional question and the merits of the case, but did not
address the request for consolidation. The claims of all three plaintiffs were tried to
the court of Judge Pierce, commencing September 10, 1979, without objection by ei-
ther side concerning the lack of formal consolidation. Telephone conversation with
Lewis Sandier, counsel for plaintiffs Nikkei and Chenax (Nov. 4, 1980).
25. "Sovereign immunity is a doctrine of international law under which domes-
tic courts, in appropriate cases, relinquish jurisdiction over a foreign state." H.R.
REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 6604, 6606 [hereinafter cited as House Report, with page numbers as re-
printed]. The British courts express the rule in broad terms:
As a consequence of the absolute independence of every sovereign author-
ity, and of the international comity which induces every sovereign state to
respect the independence and dignity of every other sovereign state, each
and every one declines to exercise by means of its courts any of its territorial
jurisdiction over the person of any sovereign ....
Sweeney, The International Law of Sovereign Immunity, 20 FORDHAM L. REV.
888, 888 (1963) (quoting the Parlement Belge, 5 P.D. 197, 217 (1880)). See generally
Note, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Giving the Plaintiff His Day
in Court, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 543, 545 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Plaintiff's Day
in Court].
26. 497 F. Supp. at 902. Generally, in international law a sovereign is immune
from the jurisdiction of foreign courts. See note 25 supra. In the United States, how-
ever, certain exceptions to the general rule of immunity were codified with the
passage of the Act in 1976. See note 41 infra. Among these exceptions is the provi-
sion that a foreign sovereign may be subject to jurisdiction if its activities outside the
United States are of a commercial nature and cause a direct effect in the United
States. See notes 46-47 infra and accompanying text.
27. See note 3 supra.
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of the "direct effect"28 clause of the Act, 29 thereby subjecting de-
fendants to the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States. 30
This Note will first examine the general purpose of the For-
eign Sovereign Immunities Act and attempt to ascertain the in-
tended meaning of the direct effect clause. It will then compare
and contrast the Nikkei court's interpretation of the clause with the
interpretations used in the other recent cases in the Southern Dis-
trict involving Nigerian cement contract disputes. Finally, this
Note will suggest that the approach used in Nikkei is both correct
and consistent with congressional intent as manifested in the legis-
lative history of the Act.
I. THE PURPOSE OF THE ACT
Prior to the passage of the Act in 1976 there were "no com-
prehensive provisions in our law available to inform parties when
they [could] have recourse to the courts to assert a legal claim
against a foreign state."-3 ' By 1976, such provisions had become a
legal and moral necessity32 because large numbers of United States
citizens were increasingly coming into contact with foreign states
and entities owned by foreign states. 33
Adopting the Act in response to this need, Congress codified
the "restrictive '34 principle of sovereign immunity as it was gener-
ally recognized in international law. 35 Under this principle, a for-
eign state is immune to suits in other countries involving only its
public acts (jure imperii),36 but not its private or commercial acts
(jure gestionis).37 The restrictive principle was codified both to en-
28. See notes 46-71 infra and accompanying text.
29. 497 F. Supp. at 905-06.
30. Id. at 906.
31. House Report, supra note 25, at 6605.
32. See Plaintiff's Day in Court, supra note 25, at 571. See also Reeves, The
Foreign Sovereign Before United States Courts, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 455, 496
(1970).
33. House Report, supra note 25, at 6605.
34. Id. at 6606. "[T]he Department of State adopted the restrictive principle of
sovereign immunity in its 'Tate Letter' of 1952." Id. at 6607 (footnote omitted). See
note 37 infra.
35. Id. at 6605.
36. Id.
37. Id. For a discussion of this distinction between the public and private acts
of a foreign sovereign, see Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor to the De-
partment of State, to Philip B. Penman, Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952), re-
printed in 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952).
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sure its application in sovereign immunity disputes arising before
United States courts and to transfer the responsibility of deter-
mining sovereign immunity from the Department of State 38 to the
judiciary. 39
It appears that Congress intended to integrate the existing
rules on subject matter and personal jurisdiction into the Act's pro-
visions. Subject matter jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a)40
in the presence of one of the exceptions to the jurisdictional im-
munity of a foreign state. The exceptions to sovereign immunity
are codified in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605-1607. 41 Interestingly, satisfac-
tion of the personal jurisdiction standard of section 1330(b)4 2 depends
upon satisfaction of the requirements of section 1330(a), provided
that proper service has been made. 43 The interconnection of these
38. House Report, supra note 25, at 6606. "In the early part of this century, the
Supreme Court began to place less emphasis on whether immunity was supported
by the law and practice of nations, and relied instead on the practices and policies of
the State Department. This trend reached its culmination in Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S.
578 (1943) and Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945)." Id.
39. Id. "The Department of State would [therefore] be freed from pressures
from foreign governments to recognize their immunity from suit and from any ad-
verse consequences resulting from an unwillingness of the Department to support
that immunity." Id.
40. 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1976). Section 1330 states:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to
amount in controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state as
defined in section 1603 (a) [of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act] as to
any claim for relief in personam with respect to which the foreign state is
not entitled to immunity either under sections 1605-1607 [of the Act] or un-
der any applicable international agreement.
(b) Personal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim
for relief over which the district courts have jurisdiction under subsection (a)
where service has been made under section 1608 of [the Act].
41. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605-1607 (1976). Section 1605 is entitled "General exceptions
to the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign state." Section 1605(a) provides exceptions
to immunity for cases involving: 1) implied or express waivers of immunity, 2) a for-
eign state's commercial activity which satisfies specified jurisdictional requirements,
3) claims concerning foreign expropriations, 4) rights in immovable property in the
United States or rights in property in the United States obtained by gift or succes-
sion, 5) certain types of non-commercial tort claims, and 6) certain admiralty claims.
"Only one exception need be applicable in order for immunity to be denied. If none
is applicable, the foreign state is entitled to dismissal of the action under section
1604." Kahale & Vega, Toward a Uniform Body of Law in Actions Against Foreign
States, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 211, 224-25 (1979). Section 1606 covers extent
of liability. Section 1607 is concerned with counterclaims. See generally id.
42. See note 40 supra.
43. Id.
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sections 44 blurs the traditional distinction between subject matter
and personal jurisdiction, with the result that both bases of juris-
diction may be obtained whenever any one of the exceptions to
immunity provided in the Act is present. 45
II. THE DIRECT EFFECT CLAUSE
Among the general exceptions to sovereign immunity provided
in the Act are three which allow the commercial activity of a for-
eign state to establish a nexus in the United States sufficient to
satisfy jurisdictional requirements. 46 Two exceptions concern activi-
ties of a foreign state in the United States. The third, covering ac-
tivities of a foreign state outside the United States which cause a
"direct effect" in the United States, 47 is the controlling provision in
44. The interconnection of the immunity and jurisdictional provisions is ex-
plained in the House Report:
For personal jurisdiction to exist under section 1330(b), the claim must first
of all be one over which the district courts have original jurisdiction under
section 1330(a), meaning a claim for which the foreign state is not entitled to
immunity. Significantly, each of the immunity provisions in the bill, sections
1605-1607, requires some connection between the lawsuit and the United
States, or an express or implied waiver by the foreign state of its immunity
from jurisdiction. These immunity provisions, therefore, prescribe the neces-
sary contacts which must exist before our courts can exercise personal juris-
diction. Besides incorporating these jurisdictional contacts by reference, sec-
tion 1330(b) also satisfies the due process requirement of adequate notice by
prescribing that proper service be made under section 1608 of the bill.
Thus, sections 1330(b), 1608, and 1605-1607 are all carefully interconnected.
House Report, supra note 25, at 6612.
45. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976). Section 1604, entitled "Immunity of a foreign state
from jurisdiction," states:
Subject to existing international agreements to which the United States
is a party at the time of enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be im-
mune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the
States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.
See note 40 supra.
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976). This section states:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of
the United States or of the States in any case
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in
the United States. by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the
United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in con-
nection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that
act causes a direct effect in the United States . . . ." (emphasis added).
47. Id. This controversial third clause is, however, based upon customary inter-
national law:
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the instant case.4 8
There are two conditions to the application of the direct effect
clause. First, the injurious act must be performed "outside the ter-
ritory of the United States." 4 9 This requirement is satisfied in the
Nikkei case by the unilateral amendments, from Nigeria, of the let-
ters of credit. 50 Second, the act must be performed in connection
with the foreign state's "commercial activity"51 outside the United
States. 52 Clearly, the contracts in Nikkei 53 were of a commercial
nature, 54 thus making the amendments of the letters of credit re-
[Ilt is certain that the courts of many countries, . . . which have given their
. . . legislation a strictly territorial character, interpret [their] law in the
sense that offenses, the authors of which at the moment of commission are
in the territory of another State, are nevertheless to be regarded as having
been committed in the national territory, if one of the constituent elements
of the offense, and more especially its effects, have taken place there.
The S.S. Lotus, [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A., No. 10, at 23, quoted in RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18, at 52-53
(1965).
48. See 497 F. Supp. at 903-05. Section 1605(a) indicates that the subsequent
provisions of the exceptions for commercial activity become operative for the pur-
pose of determining jurisdiction if the action is brought against a "foreign state," see
note 46 supra, which is defined to include "an agency or instrumentality of a foreign
state." 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (1976). In turn, an "agency or instrumentality of a foreign
state" is defined in § 1603(b) as:
any entity-(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a
majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign
state or political subdivision thereof, and (3) which is neither a citizen of a
State of the United States as defined in section 1332(c) and (d) of this title,
nor created under the laws of any third country.
Clearly, the statute is applicable to Nigeria since it is a foreign state. In addition,
the legislative history of the Act indicates the CBN would satisfy the definition of an
agency or instrumentality of a foreign state. "As a general matter, entities which
meet the definition of an 'agency or instrumentality of a foreign state' could assume a
variety of forms, including ... a central bank . . . which acts and is suable in its own
name." House Report, supra note 25, at 6614.
49. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976).
50. 497 F. Supp. at 898.
51. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976).
52. Id.
53. See notes 6-11 supra.
54. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1976). Section 1603 defines "commercial activity"
broadly as "either a regular course of commercial conduct, or a particular commercial
transaction or act." Id. It also indicates that the "commercial character of the activity
shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular
transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose." Id.
"This would mean, for example, that a foreign state's purchase of grain from a
private dealer would always be regarded as commercial, even if the grain were to
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lated to Nigeria's commercial activity outside the United States. 55
With these two conditions satisfied, what remains to be deter-
mined is whether the defendants' actions caused a direct effect in
the United States. Because the statute does not define the term,
an examination of both the legislative history and prior judicial in-
terpretation of the direct effect clause is required.
A. The Legislative History
Although the Act itself provides no guidance as to the proper
judicial test for finding a "direct effect," the Act's legislative history
provides necessary assistance. In general, the House Report indi-
cates that each of the exceptions to immunity in the Act requires
"some connection between the lawsuit and the United States." 56
It is clear, however, that "[i]n view of the interdependence of
the world's economies, most major international transactions are
serve some important government purpose, such as replenishing government stores
or feeding an army." Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States:
Hearings on H.R. 11315 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Govern-
mental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 27
(1976) (testimony of Monroe Leigh); Plaintiff's Day in Court, supra note 25, at 551
n.61.
55. The acts of defendant Nigeria which plaintiffs allege constitute antici-
patory breaches of their individual contracts took place outside the United
States and relate to Nigeria's commercial transactions with plaintiffs. The
suspension of the importation of cement and the refusal to issue documents
to plaintiffs allowing them to commence shipment of cement into Nigeria
took place in that country. Similarly, the conduct of defendant CBN which is
in dispute relates to its commercial banking activities in Nigeria. The unilat-
eral amendments of the three letters of credit occurred in Nigeria. See
Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, [488 F. Supp. at 1298] ("the 're-
pudiation' was issued in Nigeria (an act outside the United States)").
Therefore, the requirement under the "direct effect" exception under
section 1605(a)(2) that each defendant commit an act outside the United
States in connection with their [sic] commercial activities elsewhere is
satisfied.
497 F. Supp. at 905. Noteworthy is Magistrate Schreiber's recommendation to Judge
Pierce: "The cement contracts are clearly commercial in nature and Nigeria's unilat-
eral amendment of the letters of credit established pursuant to those contracts consti-
tutes 'an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with commercial
activity elsewhere.' " Decor by Nikkei Int'l, Inc. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, No.
77-2348 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 1978) (Magistrate's Recommendation 9-10). For the Propo-
sition that the courts generally predetermine what would be a just result and then
define "commercial activity" accordingly, see Note, Ixtoc I: International and Do-
mestic Remedies for Transboundary Pollution Injury, 49 FORDHAM L. REv. 404
(1980).
56. House Report, supra note 25, at 6612.
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likely to have some effect in the United States." 57 Therefore,
to determine whether there is a direct effect, the legislative his-
tory suggests that the factors to be considered are the locus and
degree of the injury, 58 its causal relation to the allegedly injurious
conduct,59 and the contacts between the activity and the forum. 60
1. The Locus of Injury Test
The legislative history indicates that the intent of the "direct
effect" clause is to "embrace commercial conduct abroad having di-
rect effects within the United States which would subject such con-
duct to the exercise of jurisdiction by the United States consistent
with principles set forth in section 18, Restatement (Second) of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States ...... (Restatement).6 1
The language of section 18 of the Restatement62 indicates that to
qualify as a direct effect under the Act, the plaintiff's alleged injury
must be "substantial" and must occur "within the [United States]
as a foreseeable [and] 'immediate causal result' of an act of the de-
fendant outside the United States in connection with defendant's
commercial activity elsewhere." 63 The jurisdictional test which is
based primarily upon section 18 has been referred to as the "locus
of injury" approach.64
57. Kahale & Vega, supra note 41, at 247.
58. See notes 61-64 infra and accompanying text.
59. Id.
60. See notes 65-69 infra and accompanying text.
61. House Report, supra note 25, at 6618. Section 18 of the Restatement reads:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal conse-
quences to conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect
within its territory, if either
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent ele-
ments of a crime or tort under the law of states that have reasonably de-
veloped legal systems, or
(b)(i) the conduct and its effects are constituent elements of activity to
which the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial;
(iii) it occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside
the territory; and (iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the principles of
justice generally recognized by states that have reasonably developed
legal systems.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18
(1965) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]. See also 497 F. Supp.
at 904.
62. See also RESTATEMENT § 18, comment f, at 50 (1965).
63. 497 F. Supp. at 904.
64. See id. at 905. The "locus of injury" test based on RESTATEMENT § 18 is
[Vol. 4:109
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2. The Minimum Contacts Requirement
There is no suggestion in the legislative history that satisfac-
tion of the locus of injury test is by itself dispositive of the question
of jurisdiction. Originally, the Act was created because of the need
for a method of informing parties when they could have access to
the courts of the United States while seeking legal redress against a
foreign state. 65 It was necessary, however, that the method se-
lected not undermine the theory of minimum contacts needed to
ensure the constitutional requirement of due process. 66 To achieve
this goal, Congress simply incorporated the broad minimum con-
tacts standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington67 and its
progeny68 directly into the Act.6 9 It can reasonably be inferred,
then, that in order to trigger application of the direct effect clause,
both the locus of injury test from section 18 of the Restatement 70
and the minimum contacts test evolving from and including Inter-
national Shoe 7' must be satisfied.
not to be confused with the actual locus of injury. The test requires that four criteria
be satisfied. The injury is to be: 1) substantial, 2) a foreseeable consequence of de-
fendants' actions, 3) an immediate causal result of defendants' conduct, and 4) felt
within the territory of the United States. The locus of injury itself refers to this
fourth criterion, the forum in which the injury is received by the plaintiff.
65. See House Report, supra note 25, at 6605.
66. "No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Supreme Court of the United States has
stated:
Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgments in personam is
grounded on their de facto power over the defendant's person .... But now
. . . due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judg-
ment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he
have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
67. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See note 66 supra.
68. See e.g., note 69 infra.
69. "b) Personal Jurisdiction.-Section 1330(b) provides, in effect, a Federal
long-arm statute over foreign states .... The requirements of minimum jurisdictional
contacts and adequate notice are embodied in the provision. Cf. International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), and McGee v. International Life Insurance
Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957)." House Report, supra note 25, at 6612. The minimum
contacts requirement is not specifically mentioned in the legislative history's expla-
nation of the "direct effect" clause. It explicitly applies, however, to all sections in-
corporated by reference into § 1330(b), including the "direct effect" provision of
§ 1605, as noted earlier. See notes 39-45 supra and accompanying text.
70. See notes 61-64 supra and accompanying text.
71. See notes 66 & 69 supra and accompanying text.
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III. APPLICATION OF THE DIRECT EFFECT
CLAUSE IN THE NIGERIAN CEMENT CASES
The Nikkei case, Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria,72
and Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of
Nigeria,73 all concerned similar disputes over 1975 cement con-
tracts with Nigeria. 74 All involved identical requests by the sell-
ers for letters of credit to be established at their respective banks
and subsequent unilateral amendments by Nigeria of letters of
credit established, contrary to the terms of the contract, at Morgan
in New York. 75 The court in each case, however, used a distinctly
different approach in deciding the jurisdictional issue.
In Verlinden, where the plaintiff was a foreign corporation, the
court found that the locus of injury test was not satisfied, never
reaching the question of minimum contacts. 76 In Texas Trading,
where jurisdiction was also denied, the court found that the dispos-
itive element was the issue of minimum contacts. 77 The court in
Nikkei, however, did find jurisdiction, holding that the standards of
both the locus of injury, test and the minimum contacts test had
been independently satisfied.78 The following sections will examine
the rationale of each decision, focusing on a comparison of the spe-
cific elements of the different tests used in the three cases.
A. The Verlinden Approach: Finding the Locus of Injury
In determining the standard for a direct effect in Verlinden,
Judge Edward Weinfeld noted: "In applying this section [section
18 of the Restatement] courts have uniformly held that the locus of
72. 488 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
73. No. 78-2395, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 1980).
74. See note 19 supra.
75. 488 F. Supp. at 1287; No. 78-2395, slip op. at 3. In both Verlinden and
Texas Trading plaintiffs had contracted in 1975 to sell cement to Nigeria. The Nige-
rian government had agreed to establish individual letters of credit with Verlinden
and with Texas Trading Co. through the Slavensburg Bank in Amsterdam and the Fi-
delity International Bank in New York, respectively. Nigeria unilaterally advised the
unconfirmed letters of credit through Morgan instead, and then unilaterally amended
the letters of credit to provide as they had in Nikkei. See note 21 supra and accompa-
nying text. The only material differences were that Verlinden was a foreign plaintiff
and that it restricted its claim to one for anticipatory breach of the letter of credit.
488 F. Supp. at 1285-87.
76. See notes 79-90 infra and accompanying text.
77. See notes 91-112 infra and accompanying text.
78. 497 F. Supp. at 905-06.
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injury is dispositive of jurisdiction." 79 Placing greatest emphasis
upon determining the forum in which the plaintiff, a Dutch corpo-
ration, felt the economic effect of defendants' conduct,80 the court
in Verlinden held that receipt of the repudiation by Morgan in
New York did not constitute injury in the United States. 8 ' Conse-
quently, jurisdiction over defendant was denied for failure to satisfy
the locus of injury requirement.82
Since Judge. Weinfeld did not enumerate the factors used in
determining that the locus of injury was outside the United States,
some speculation is required in order to identify the factors consid-
ered by the court in reaching its conclusion. For this purpose, the
dictum of the court is instructive.8 3 Citing Judge Goettel's dictum
79. 488 F. Supp. at 1298. The Nikkei court saw this as implying "that both the
minimum contacts standard and the requirement of a substantial, foreseeable and im-
mediate causal effect are satisfied when the locus of injury is in the United States."
497 F. Supp. at 905.
For its proposition that the locus of injury is dispositive of jurisdiction, the
Verlinden court cited, among others, Carey v. National Oil Corp., 592 F.2d 673, 676
(2d Cir. 1979) (effect on parent corporation of injury to its foreign subsidiary deemed
"indirect"). Carey indicated that to find a "direct effect" it was necessary that there
be a causal result of defendants' conduct in the United States. The court found that
such a causal relation between the defendants' conduct and the plaintiff's injury was
lacking, so that there would be no "direct effect." There was no specific mention of
the "locus of injury" test of RESTATEMENT § 18, or of the forum in which the plain-
tiff sustained the injury (the actual locus of injury). Without a "causal effect," the lo-
cus of injury was not only not dispositive of the question of jurisdiction in Carey, it
was irrelevant. Also contrary to Verlinden's implication, the Carey court placed equal
emphasis on the lack of minimum contacts needed to satisfy the standard of Interna-
tional Shoe. The court declared that for this additional reason, the level of "direct ef-
fect" could not be reached. 592 F.2d at 676-77.
80. 488 F. Supp. at 1298. The court stated: "In applying this section courts
have uniformly held that the locus of injury is dispositive of jurisdiction-indeed,
that factor takes precedence over the citizenship of the victim." Id. (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted).
81. Id. Presumably, the court reasoned that the plaintiff was injured not where
its bank received news of the repudiation, but rather where it actually sustained the
economic injury (in Amsterdam, where the corporation was located). The actual locus
of injury, however, was never explicitly determined in Verlinden.
82. For support of his reasoning, Judge Weinfeld cited Harris v. VAO,
Intourist, Moscow, 481 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), a case in which a Moscow
hotel's tortious conduct caused injury to an American citizen in Moscow. See notes
99-102 infra and accompanying text. Because Harris denied jurisdiction on the
ground that the "indirect effect" of the defendants' conduct was in the United States,
so that, conversely, the direct effect was impliedly outside the United States, the
case lends itself to Judge Weinfeld's analogous. reasoning in Verlinden. See 481 F.
Supp. at 1062.
83. 488 F. Supp. at 1299.
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in National American Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria,8 4 the
Verlinden court noted that in a hypothetical situation involving the
breach of a letter of credit which 1) had a New York beneficiary,
and 2) was advised and payable through a New York bank, 85 "the
act of anticipatory repudiation [would have] a direct effect in New
York."8' 6 The facts in this example differ from Verlinden only in
that the letter of credit in this hypothetical situation had a New
York, rather than a foreign, beneficiary. 87 Since the court suggested
that this change would be sufficient to warrant assertion of jurisdic-
tion over defendants, it appeais that the citizenship, domicile, or
residence of the plaintiff must be an important factor in deter-
mining the locus of injury. 8
The conclusion, therefore, that can be drawn from analysis of
the holding and the hypothetical example in Verlinden is that the
factors determinative of whether the direct effect of defendants'
conduct reached the forum are: 1) the relation between the place
where plaintiff claims to have sustained its alleged injury and the
citizenship, domicile, or residence of the plaintiff,89 and 2) the
place of payment under the letter of credit. 90 Because receipt of
the repudiation by Morgan in New York, when plaintiff was in the
Netherlands, was not deemed sufficient in itself to satisfy the locus
of injury requirement, there was no further jurisdictional inquiry in
Verlinden. As a result, it remains unclear whether the locus of in-
jury approach of Verlinden incorporates in its analysis the mini-
mum contacts standard of International Shoe and its progeny.
84. National Am. Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622, 639
(S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 597 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979). In National, jurisdiction was
granted in a similar Nigerian cement contract dispute, but on the basis of quasi in
rem attachment which was available in federal courts by virtue of FED. R. Civ. P. 64,
levied against funds at Morgan held in CBN's name.
85. 488 F. Supp. at 1299, citing 448 F. Supp. at 639 (dictum).
86. 488 F. Supp. at 1299.
87. See id.
88. This dictum seems to contradict the downplaying in Verlinden of the im-
portance of the plaintiff's citizenship. See note 80 supra. Since in commercial activ-
ity, the plaintiff's domicile, place of citizenship, or residence will almost always be
the place of the receipt of economic injury, the factors seem inextricably linked in
commercial situations.
89. See note 88 supra.
90. This factor is important because it represents the place of the actual receipt
of the repudiation.
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B. Texas Trading and the Minimum Contacts Approach
In Texas Trading, the court denied jurisdiction in a case pre-
senting the precise fact pattern envisioned in the Verlinden dic-
tum 9' and stated that an examination of the contacts between the
defendants and the specific transaction at issue was required. 92 Al-
though mentioning the test of section 18 of the Restatement, 93 the
court emphasized that the direct effect requirement "is fulfilled
only when there are significant contacts between the transaction
underlying the cause of action and the United States." 94 The Texas
Trading court thus minimized the importance of the locus of injury
test, placing much greater emphasis on the minimum contacts test
than was intended by Congress. 95
Curiously, in denying jurisdiction for lack of sufficient contacts,
Judge John Cannella asserted that he was relying on the broad
standard of International Shoe,96 although he actually applied a
91. See notes 84-88 supra and accompanying text.
92. No. 78-2395, slip op. at 9 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 1980). In Texas Trading, the
court stated:
Even if the defendants' embargo, unilateral amendment of the letter of
credit, and alleged breach of the settlement agreement, are commercial ac-
tivities, the language of the statute still requires that such conduct occurring
outside the United States have a "direct effect" in the United States. While
the meaning of "direct effect" in this context is less than clear, it does indi-
cate that an examination of the defendants' contacts with the United States
in connection with the specific transaction at issue is required.
Id. See also East Europe Domestic Int'l Sales Corp. v. Terra, 467 F. Supp. 303, 388
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 610 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1979).
93. No. 78-2395, slip op. at 10 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 1980). The Texas Trading
court quoted the text of § 18 of the RESTATEMENT, but did not deal with any of its
specific elements. Id. See note 94 infra.
94. No. 78-2395, slip op. at 12 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 1980). The court stated, "[Als
difficult as analogies are in this context, the import of both § 18 and comparisons to
the District of Columbia's long-arm statute is that the 'direct effect' requirement of §
1605(a)(2) is fulfilled only where there are significant contacts between the transac-
tion underlying the cause of action and the United States." Id.; see note 97 infra.
This is apparently the converse of the implication in Verlinden, see note 79 supra
and accompanying text, for this last phrase suggests that satisfaction of the minimum
contacts standard also satisfies the test of § 18 of the RESTATEMENT.
95. See notes 56-71 supra and accompanying text.
96. No. 78-2395, slip op. at 16 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 1980). In its conclusion, the
court stated: "Since the allegations of plaintiff's complaint do not fulfill the 'mini-
mum contacts' requirements of International Shoe and its progeny, they cannot
reach the level of 'direct effect' described in section 1605(a)(2)." Id. The Texas Trad-
ing court never acknowledged the fact that the legislative history designates Interna-
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minimum contacts test based on the stricter standard of the Dis-
trict of Columbia long arm statute.9 7 In support of its approach,
the court cited not only the Act's legislative history, 98 but also
portions of Harris v. VAO Intourist, Moscow," a wrongfd death
tional Shoe and its progeny as the minimum contacts standard for the Act. Instead,
the court cited Carey v. National Oil Corp. as the authority for using International
Shoe. Id.
97. Id. at 10. After mentioning the legislative history's reference to § 18 of the
RESTATEMENT and neglecting to mention the legislative history's reference to Inter-
national Shoe, see note 96 supra, the court stated that "further guidance is provided
by the District of Columbia's long arm statute." Id., citing House Report, supra note
25, at 6612. The court was referring to the legislative history's indication that §
1330(b), see note 40 supra, was intended to operate as "a Federal long-arm statute
over foreign states," and for this purpose was "patterned after the long-arm statute
Congress enacted for the District Columbia." House Report, supra note 25, at 6612.
The District of Columbia long-arm statute provides in pertinent part:
A District of Columbia court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a per-
son, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim for relief arising from the
person's-
(1) transacting any business in the District of Columbia;
(2) contracting to supply services in the District of Columbia;
(3) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omis-
sion in the District of Columbia;
(4) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or
omission outside the District of Columbia if he regularly does or solic-
its business, engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or de-
rives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed, or services
rendered, in the District of Columbia;
(5) having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in the Dis-
trict of Columbia; or
(6) contracting to insure or act as surety for or on any person, property,
or risk, contract, obligation, or agreement located, executed, or to be
performed within the District of Columbia at the time of contracting,
unless the parties otherwise provide in writing.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 13-423(a) (1973) (emphasis added).
98. See note 97 supra.
99. 481 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). The court in Texas Trading quoted
Harris, in an effort to justify selection of the D.C. statute's standard as the standard
for a "direct effect":
This interpretation and the legislative history already adverted to would
suggest that section 13-423(a)(4) of the District of Columbia statute dealing
with tortious acts or omissions outside the District causing tortious injury
within the District provides the strongest analogy to the direct effect clause
of section 1605(a)(2) in a factual situation such as the one before us.
Id. at 1064, quoted in No. 78-2395, slip op. at 12 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 1980).
Similarly, the Texas Trading court was quoting Harris when it declared that "the
Act, however, 'authorize[s] the exercise of less than the complete personal jurisdic-
tion that might constitutionally be afforded American courts under traditional con-
cepts of fairness and due process,' " thereby enunciating a jurisdictional standard
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action brought by the estate of a United States citizen killed in a
Moscow hotel fire.' 0 0 The Harris court employed what it referred
to as a "minimum contacts" analysis, based on the District of Colum-
bia statute's standard. 0' This analysis, however, was in fact only a
more strict than that of International Shoe. 481 F. Supp. at 1059, quoted in No.
78-2395, slip op. at 7-8 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 1980). It is interesting to note that the
Harris court actually went further than this and suggested that the bases of jurisdic-
tion for the Act were even "less comprehensive than those found in the usual juris-
dictional statutes of the states and the District of Columbia." 481 F. Supp. at 1059.
This indicates that an extremely strict standard was used in Harris, thus making
Texas Trading's claimed reliance upon both Harris and International Shoe paradox-
ical.
100. 481 F. Supp. at 1057-58.
101. Id. at 1061 & 1063-64. See note 99 supra.
Because the legislative history does mention both the District of Columbia stat-
ute and International Shoe in the same breath, there could initially appear to be an
inconsistency as to which minimum contacts standard Congress intended to be ap-
plied to actions under the Act. See House Report, supra note 25, at 6612. The confu-
sion which has arisen concerning this point centers on interpretation of the phrase
"patterned after." See note 97 supra. Texas Trading and Harris have held it to mean
that the District of Columbia long-arm statute may be relied upon for its jurisdic-
tional standard in cases under the Act. See No. 78-2395, slip op. at 10-12 (S.D.N.Y.
July 16, 1980); 481 F. Supp. at 1061 & 1063-64. Comparison of selected portions of
the Act and the D.C. statute reveals that there is in fact a close correspondence be-
tween the areas of activity considered in the provisions of each, and suggests that
Congress did rely upon the D.C. statute at least for the scope of the subject matter
considered of importance in formulating a comprehensive federal long-arm statute.
Provisions (1) and (2) of the D.C. long-argm statute (D.C. CODE ANN. § 13-423
(1973)) refer to commercial activity in the District of Columbia, while the first two
clauses of 1605(a)(2) refer to commercial activity in the United States. Provision (3)
of the D.C. statute deals with tortious injury by act or omission in the United States,
while 1605(a)(5) is concerned with personal injury by act or omission occurring in
the United States. Provision (4) of the D.C. statute applies to an act outside the Dis-
trict of Columbia causing injury in the District, while the third clause of §
1605(a)(2) deals with injurious conduct outside the United States having a direct ef-
fect in the United States. See notes 46-47 supra. A reasonable inference may be made
that this structural modeling is the only "patterning" to which the legislative history
refers, particularly in light of the specific designation of International Shoe and its
progeny as the minimum contacts standard for the Act. See note 69 supra. There is
no evidence either in the Act or in its legislative history which indicates that the
phrase "patterned after" was intended to suggest any more than this superficial re-
semblance between the provisions of each statute.
The Texas Trading and Harris courts demonstrated an instinctive understanding
of the difficulty and inappropriateness of applying the standard of the D.C. statute,
which makes distinctions based on classifications such as "commercial" and "tort,"
to cases arising under the Act, which makes its basic distinctions between "govern-
mental" and "commercial" activity. No. 78-2395, slip op. at 10-11 (S.D.N.Y. July 16,
1980), quoting 481 F. Supp. at 1063-64; see Note, The Virginia "Long Arm" Statute,
VA. L. REV. 719, 732 (1965). In both cases, however, the courts never realized that,
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rearranged version of the locus of injury test from section 18 of the
Restatement.' 0 2 The failure of the Texas Trading court to recognize
according to the legislative history, the difficulty need never have arisen. See notes
67-69 supra and accompanying text. It should be noted that the Nikkei court fol-
lowed the legislative history and avoided the unnecessary dilemma by relying solely
upon the broad standard of International Shoe and its progeny for determining the
question of minimum contacts. 497 F. Supp. at 902-06.
102. 481 F. Supp. at 1062-63. In essence, under Judge Weinstein's analysis in
Harris, satisfaction of all of the elements of the locus of injury test of § 18 of the
RESTATEMENT will result in a finding of jurisdiction under § 1605(a)(2). The struc-
ture of Judge Weinstein's analysis, however, obscures this fact. In Harris, a new def-
inition for "direct effect" was fashioned: "Thus, as derived from section 18 of the
Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Laws of the United States, direct ef-
fect refers to an effect which is both substantial and the direct and foreseeable re-
sult of conduct outside the jurisdiction." Id. at 1063 (emphasis added). This defini-
tion of "direct effect" comprises all of the criteria of the "locus of injury" test of the
RESTATEMENT § 18, with the exception of the locus of injury factor itself. See note
64 supra.
The relationship between the minimum contacts test and a "direct effect" (as de-
fined above) is described in Harris as one in which "the 'direct effect' requirement
in the third clause of section 1605(a)(2), like the tortious injury requirements of the
District of Columbia long-arm section, exists to partially satisfy the requirement
that a non-resident have sufficient contacts with the forum before the courts can ex-
ercise in personam jurisdiction." 481 F. Supp. at 1062 (emphasis added). It is not im-
mediately clear in Harris what additional factor(s) must be present in order to com-
plete the "partially" satisfied requirement of sufficient contacts. Harris indicates that
the forum in which the injury is received is not important if the injury is not direct.
Therefore, the court demands satisfaction of the "direct effect" requirement (with
emphasis on "direct," id. at 1063) before it will consider the question of where the
effect occurred. Clearly the actual locus of injury is not considered relevant under
the Harris definition of "direct effect" as it is applied to the specific facts of that
case:
Obviously the negligent operation of a hotel in Moscow causing the
death of a United States resident has effects in the United States; here it
leaves aggrieved relatives in this country. But the precise issue is not
whether the fire had any effect here, but whether it had a "direct effect" in
the United States within the meaning of the statutory language. Indirect in-
jurious consequences within this country of an out-of-state act are not suffi-
cient contacts to satisfy the direct effect requirements of section 1605(a)(2).
Id. at 1062 (emphasis added). Here the Harris court grants that the injury com-
plained of by the plaintiff occurred within this country. Because the injury was not
"substantial," however, there could be no "direct effect" under the Harris definition,
and hence, there could be no extension of jurisdiction. Id. at 1065. For confirmation
of this reasoning, Harris relies on Upton v. Empire of Iran, 459 F. Supp. 264
(D.D.C. 1978), a case presenting facts similar to those in Harris. In Upton, the court
found that suffering pain within the United States as a consequence of personal inju-
ries incurred outside the jurisdiction was insufficient to invoke jurisdiction. See 481
F. Supp. at 1065. The Harris reliance on Upton indicates that there is a great deal of
importance attached to determination of the locus of injury. It is reasonable, in fact,
to infer that the locus of injury is the additional factor needed to completely satisfy
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the true nature of the Harris test helped lead to Texas Trading's
complete omission of a locus of injury analysis, and to its anoma-
lous application of the D.C. statute's standard to determine
whether the standard of International Shoe had been satisfied.10 3
Despite this oversight, 104 the Texas Trading court's application
of reasoning analogous to that used to deny jurisdiction in Harris
would still have been justified were there greater similarity between
the cases. Harris, however, involved a claim of tortious personal in-
jury whose direct effect, the death of a United States citizen,
occurred outside the United States. In that case the only link with
the forum was the United States citizenship of the plaintiff. Texas
Trading, in contrast, was a contract action involving a New York
plaintiff, a letter of credit payable in New York, and the receipt in
New York of the repudiation (the alleged injury) of that letter of
credit. 10 5 The Texas Trading facts appear to reflect significantly
more contacts with the territory of the forum than were present in
Harris, thereby casting doubt on the propriety of employing rea-
soning by analogy from Harris to Texas Trading. ' 0 6
the requirements of sufficient contacts. Although the emphasis in Harris is on the
degree of the injury, it does seem that failure to determine the forum in which the
injury allegedly occurred would preclude any finding of an effect as either direct or
indirect. It may be patently obvious, but it would be impossible to measure a tangi-
ble effect without knowing the point of spatial reference at which it is to be mea-
sured.
One might speculate that, in Harris, had there been a "substantial" effect
occurring within the United States, then the locus of injury in the United States
would have completed the requirement of sufficient contacts which had been par-
tially satisfied by a finding of a "direct effect," as it was defined in that case. Al-
though the Harris court purported to use a minimum contacts analysis, the result of
the redefinition of "direct effect" is apparently only an unnecessarily complicated
application of the "locus of injury" test of RESTATEMENT § 18.
103. See notes 99-101 supra; text accompanying note 97 supra.
104. It should be noted that Judge Cannella's decision on the jurisdictional is-
sue, in answer to defendants' motion to dismiss on grounds of sovereign immunity,
was rendered without the benefit of any substantial evidence on the question having
been submitted to him by the plaintiff's attorneys. See, e.g., No. 78-2395, slip op.
(S.D.N.Y. July 16, 1980) (Affadavits for Plaintiff-no mention of the jurisdictional
problem).
105. See note 75 supra.
106. The Texas Trading court justified its denial of jurisdiction, stating:
[I]n Harris, Judge Weinstein concluded that defendants' alleged acts of
negligence in causing the death of plaintiff's American decedent in a
Moscow hotel fire did not cause a 'direct effect' in the United States within
the meaning of the third exception to section 1605(a)(2), since the only con-
tact with the forum was an 'injurious consequence' of conduct occurring out-
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Although the basis for the selection of the jurisdictional
standard and for the reasoning used in Texas Trading is suspect,
the decision cannot be fully understood without examining the fac-
tors considered by the court in denying jurisdiction for lack of suffi-
cient contacts. The court held that (1) "the only effect in the
United States asserted by the plaintiff was that the letter of credit
was payable in New York to the plaintiff, a New York corporation,
through a New York correspondent bank of the Central Bank"; 10 7
(2) the letter of credit was payable in New York as an accommoda-
tion to the plaintiff, so that the purported injury caused by the
breach of contract took place "only because the plaintiff [was] dom-
iciled or doing business here, [which] is an insufficient contact for
due process purposes";' 08 (3) while "the defendants' alleged breach
of the contract and letter of credit may have had foreseeable effects
in the United States, 'foreseeability' alone has never been a suffi-
cient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the Due Process
Clause"; 109 (4) Congress intended to bestow jurisdiction only in
cases in which there is a "degree of contact beyond that occasioned
simply by U.S. citizenship or U.S. residence of the plaintiff"; 110
and (5) "there is no indication in the present case that the defen-
dants purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting
side the United States.
No. 78-2395, slip op. at 12-13 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 1980). This analysis of the Harris
decision is not quite accurate, however. Judge Weinstein in Harris did not deny ju-
risdiction because "the only contact with the forum was an 'injurious conse-
quence.' " The Harris court denied jurisdiction because the contact with the forum
was an "indirect" injurious consequence. 481 F. Supp. at 1062 (emphasis added).
That is, there was no "direct" contact, within the Harris court's definition of the "di-
rect effect" requirement. The concern in Harris was not with the number of contacts
with the forum, as Texas Trading suggests. Instead, it was a concern with regard to
causality. Texas Trading's reliance on the Harris court's denial of jurisdiction is there-
fore more unjustifiable in light of this additional distinction between the two cases.
107. No. 78-2395, slip op. at 13 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 1980).
108. Id. at 13-14, quoting East Europe Domestic Int'l Sales Corp. v. Terra, 467
F. Supp. 383, 390 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 610 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1979).
109. No. 78-2395, slip op. at 14 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 1980), quoting World-Wide
Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980).
110. No. 78-2395, slip op. at 14 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 1980), quoting House Report,
supra note 25, at 6616. Judge Cannella acknowledged that this language is taken
from the legislative history's section on "commercial activity carried on in the
United States" (the first exception of §1605(a)(2)), rather than from Congress' analysis
of the "direct effect" clause itself. The application of the language quoted, therefore,
is somewhat inappropriate.
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business in the United States ...... I In short, the court held
that the citizenship of the plaintiff and the site of payment of the
letter of credit, being the only connections with the forum, were
not in themselves sufficient to satisfy the minimum contacts test.
Accordingly, jurisdiction over Nigeria and CBN was denied. 112
C. The Nikkei Decision
Relying heavily on the legislative history of the Act, the Nikkei
court determined that the direct effect exception required not only
that the substantial, foreseeable, and immediate causal result of de-
fendants' actions be an injury in the United States, 113 but also that
there be sufficient minimum contacts between the matter in con-
troversy and the United States to support jurisdiction under Inter-
national Shoe. 114 Deciding that the two tests were separate, and of
equal importance, the court acknowledged that it was taking a dif-
ferent approach, and reaching different conclusions, from those of
the courts in Verlinden and Texas Trading. 115
1. The Locus of Injury Test in Nikkei
In determining that all of the criteria of the locus of injury test
were satisfied, 116 the Nikkei court first found that the anticipatory
111. No. 78-2395, slip op. at 16 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 1980), citing Carey v. Na-
tional Oil Corp., 592 F.2d 673, 677 (2d Cir. 1979). See also Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
112. No. 78-2395, slip op. at 16-17 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 1980).
113. See notes 61-64 supra and accompanying text.
114. 497 F. Supp. at 904. See notes 65-71 supra and accompanying text. The
Second Circuit provided support for this two-tiered approach in Carey v. National
Oil Corp., 592 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1979). See note 79 supra.
115. 497 F. Supp. at 905-06; see notes 76-78 supra and accompanying text.
116. The court held:
The alleged breaches of each of the three cement contracts and three
letters of credit by the defendants caused substantial, foreseeable, and im-
mediate injury to plaintiffs in New York. Each plaintiff is a New York corpo-
ration and payment was to be made to each plaintiff in New York through
Morgan Guaranty Trust Company under the letters of credit. Similarly, the
three cement contracts were effectively amended to provide for payment
thereunder in New York by Nigeria's unilateral establishment of the letters
of credit with CBN, all of which were payable in New York. Under these
circumstances, the locus of injury was in New York.
497 F. Supp. at 906; see notes 61-64 supra and accompanying text. It appears that the
second to last sentence of Judge Pierce's statement is superfluous. There is clearly
no relation between the "locus of injury" test and the fact that the letters of credit
were amended unilaterally by Nigeria.
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breaches of the contracts and letters of credit directly caused signif-
icant injury to the plaintiffs. 117 The court did not separately con-
sider the "substantial, "foreseeable," and "immediate causal effect"
requirements of the locus of injury test, but such an analysis was
undertaken in the Magistrate's Recommendation to the Nikkei
court, 118 upon which, presumably, Judge Pierce relied. In deciding
that the direct effect of this injury was in New York the Nikkei
court considered the determinative factors to be: 1) the citizenship
and domicile of the plaintiffs, 119 and 2) the actual site of payment
under the contracts and letters of credit. 120
117. 497 F. Supp. at 906; note 116 supra.
118. Magistrate Schreiber states:
[T]he pivotal question for this court to determine is whether there has been
a direct, foreseeable and substantial effect within the United States as a re-
sult of the amendment of the letters of credit.
All of the beneficiaries of the letters of credit were incorporated in New
York and the letters were payable at Morgan Guaranty Bank in New York.
Nigeria's amendment of the letters directly affected the beneficiaries in
New York, for after the amendment none could collect the debts owed to it
without the appropriate documents newly demanded by Nigeria. This effect
was foreseeable by that nation, because it had entered contracts with New
York corporations, made payable at a New York bank and expressly in-
structed Morgan Guaranty Bank in New York to dishonor letters of credit
not complying with the amended payment procedures. Finally, the effects
of the attempted amendment of the contracts are substantial, for over
$42,000,000 worth of credit owed to the three plaintiffs has been cancelled.
Decor by Nikkei Int'l, Inc. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, No. 77-2348 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 19, 1978) (Magistrate's Recommendation 10) (emphasis added). It is interesting
to note that Magistrate Schreiber concluded the analysis with rationale similar to that
used in Harris. See note 102 supra. He stated:
Accordingly, this court has subject matter jurisdiction prusuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a)(2).
Personal jurisdiction also exists over defendant Nigeria pursuant to §
1330(b) of the Immunities Act. The legislative history of that section of the
statute supports such a finding on the ground that Nigeria's conduct in con-
nection with contracts having foreseeable and substantial effects in New
York provides in and of itself, sufficient contact with this state for due proc-
ess purposes.
Id. at 10-11 (emphasis added). Judge Pierce did not follow Magistrate Schreiber's
finding that a direct, foreseeable and substantial effect, such as he had just de-
scribed, would by itself satisfy the minimum contacts requirement. 497 F. Supp. at
906.
119. 497 F. Supp. at 906. See note 116 supra.
120. 497 F. Supp. at 906. From these two factors it appears that the Nikkei lo-
cus of injury test would not have been satisfied in Verlinden, because the plaintiff in
that case was a foreign citizen. By the same token, this locus of injury test would be
satisfied in Texas Trading by virtue of a fact pattern nearly identical to that of
Nikkei. See note 75 supra.
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2. The Minimum Contacts Test in Nikkei
The minimum contacts test used in Nikkei considers "not
merely whether there are sufficient contacts with respect to the
contract in dispute, but more broadly, whether maintenance of the
suit offends 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice
... '"121 Indicating that "[t]he contacts between the defendant
and the forum must be such that it is reasonable to require the de-
fendant to litigate the dispute in that forum," 122 the court selected
the test of World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 123 International
Shoe's most recent offspring, for its list of the factors used in
determining whether reasonable contacts are present. The factors
enumerated were: 1) the burden on the defendant of litiga-
ting in that forum, 2) the interest of the forum in adjudicating the
dispute, and 3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and
effective resolution of its claim. 124
In principle, the Nikkei decision is in accord with Texas Trad-
ing's finding that the citizenship of the plaintiff and the site of pay-
ment are not in themselves sufficient to support a finding of juris-
diction. 125 The Nikkei court, however, disagreed with Texas Trad-
ing's assertion that these two factors represented the only contacts
between defendants and the forum. 126
The conflict between the two cases involves the first part of
the World-Wide Volkswagen test: the determination of the burden
on the defendants of litigating in New York. 127 The major point of
121. 497 F. Supp. at 905, quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 316 (1945). See note 66 supra.
122. 497 F. Supp. at 905.
123. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
124. Id.; 497 F. Supp. at 905.
125. See note 112 supra and accompanying text.
126. On the subject of the "foreseeabilty" factor not being "a benchmark for
personal jurisdiction," Judge Pierce took no exception. See note 109 supra and ac-
companying text. Instead, he used "foreseeability" as one of the factors in deciding
if the "locus of injury" was satisfied, but even there it was by no means solely deter-
minative. See notes 116-20 supra and accompanying text.
127. See text accompanying note 124 supra. There is no significant dis-
agreement concerning satisfaction of the second and third criteria of the minimum
contacts test of World-Wide Volkswagen. In deciding the interest of the forum in
adjudicating the dispute (the second factor), the court noted, "Congress has indicated
that in enacting the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act it intended to insure that 'our
citizens will have access to the courts in order to resolve ordinary legal disputes.' "
497 F. Supp. at 906, quoting House Report, snpra note 25, at 6605. This places great
1980]
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contention concerns the assertion in Texas Trading that Nigeria es-
tablished the letter of credit, payable in New York, as an "accom-
modation to plaintiff."' 28 This determination supported the findings
in that case that the place of payment was occasioned only by the
fortuity of the plaintiff's citizenship, and that there was no indica-
tion that the defendants had purposefully availed themselves of the
privilege of doing business in the United States. Based on these
findings, the Texas Trading court held that it would be unreasona-
bly burdensome on defendants to require that they litigate in New
York.' 29 In contrast is the finding in Nikkei that New York was not
selected as the place for payment solely because of the citizenship
of the plaintiffs.1 30 Instead, the court found that defendants had ad-
vised the letters of credit through Morgan and had designated
Morgan as the sole place of payment entirely for their own conven-
ience. 131
Although the Nikkei cotirt did not specify its reasons for these
findings, there is a great deal of support for the argument that the
burden on defendants of litigating in New York was not unreason-
able, 132 particularly in view of the corresponding banking relation-
ship which existed between CBN and Morgan. 133 Not only had
CBN established letters of credit for at least fourteen of Nigeria's
cement contracts through Morgan's New York branch, 134 but also
weight on the factor of the plaintiff's citizenship. Cf. Verlinden, B.V. v. Central
Bank of Nigeria, 488 F. Supp. 1284, 1298 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("the locus of injury is
dispositive of jurisdiction-indeed, that factor takes precedence over the citizenship
of the victim."). See note 80 supra and accompanying text.
The court also determined that the third criterion was satisfied, finding that
plaintiffs clearly had a "substantial interest in a convenient and effective resolution
of their individual claims which they may not, under the circumstances, otherwise
obtain elsewhere." 497 F. Supp. at 906.
128. No. 78-2345 slip op. at 13 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 1980). See note 108 supra and
accompanying text.
129. Id. See notes 107-12 sispra and accompanying text.
130. 497 F. Supp. at 906.
131. Id.
132. See notes 133-43 infra and accompanying text.
133. See notes 134-37 infra and accompanying text. It was held in Verlinden
that maintaining a correspondent banking relationship is not by itself sufficient to
constitute "substantial contact." 488 F. Supp. at 1296. There is nothing, however, to
suggest that it would be improper to use this existing relationship as one of the fac-
tors in determining whether defendants' actions were self-serving, or merely accom-
modations to plaintiffs, for the purpose of satisfying a part of the "burden on the de-
fendant" test of World-Wide Volkswagen. See text accompanying note 124 supra.
134. Decor by Nikkei Int'l, Inc. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, No. 77-2348
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1978) (Pretrial Deposition of Alfred Koelbel 36).
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CBN had further availed itself of the protection of United States
laws 135 by keeping between 100 million and one billion dollars13 6 in
its account at Morgan. This in itself indicates the convenience to
Nigeria of having Morgan as the place of payment. Moreover, if
the defendants had wished to accommodate plaintiffs, they could
simply have instructed Morgan to advise the letters of credit
through the banks originally requested by plaintiffs. 137 It is difficult
to see how Nigeria accommodated plaintiffs by disregarding their
requests.
Finally, the Texas Trading court's finding that New York was
selected as the location for payment of the letters of credit merely
by the fortuity of the plaintiffs' citizenship and as an accommoda-
tion to plaintiff' 3 8 is not wholly supported by the implications of
certain instances of defendants' past conduct. In Verlinden, for ex-
ample, CBN ignored both Verlinden's Dutch citizenship and its re-
quest for payment at the Slavensburg Bank in Amsterdam. 139 In-
stead, CBN advised the letter of credit through Morgan in New
York, 140 as evidence suggests was its custom.141 In that case, with
the plaintiff in Amsterdam, no argument can rationalize the unilat-
eral establishment of the letter of credit at Morgan as having been
performed for any purpose other than that of convenience to de-
fendants. The facts of Verlinden demonstrate a past failure of de-
fendants to accommodate their cement supplier when establishing
a letter of credit for payment, and might support an inference in
the Nikkei case that defendants had again considered only their
own convenience when choosing Morgan in New York as the situs
for payment. Accordingly, the Nikkei court determined that the
burden on defendants of litigating in New York was not unreason-
able, thus satisfying the remaining criterion of the World-Wide
Volkswagen test and supporting a finding that minimum contacts
were present for due process purposes. 142
135. See note 111 supra and accompanying text.
136. National Am. Corp. v. Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (Trial Min-
utes at 311-13) (testimony of George W. Ryan, official at the Federal Reserve Bank).
137. See note 13 supra.
138. No. 78-2395, slip op. at 13-15 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 1980). See notes 107-11
supra and accompanying text.
139. 488 F. Supp. at 1287. See note 75 siipra.
140. See note 75 so pra.
141. See notes 133-37 supra and accompanying text.
142. 497 F. Supp. at 906.
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Satisfaction of the minimum contacts test, together with the
determination that New York was the locus of a substantial and
foreseeable injury, justified the invoking of jurisdiction over
Nigeria and CBN in Nikkei through application of the "direct effect"
exception to sovereign immunity as it was interpreted by Judge
Pierce. Clearly, the Nikkei decision not only comports with con-
gressional intent as expressed in the legislative history of the For-
eign Sovereign Immunities Act and satisfies all constitutional due
process requirements, but it also sets a valuable precedent for
achieving just resolutions of many jurisdictional disputes. 143
CONCLUSION
The Nikkei decision should lead to disposition of the juris-
dictional question in most of the current Nigerian cement contract
actions. Furthermore, by requiring independent satisfaction of the
locus of injury test and the minimum contacts test, and by
designating the criteria to be satisfied within each, this case pro-
vides a fair and uniformly applicable method of determining juris-
diction in any "direct effect" case. 144 Consequently, the two-
pronged Nikkei test should stand as a touchstone for future cases
involving application of the direct effect clause of the Foreign Sov-
ereign Immunities Act.
J. Blair Richardson, Jr.
143. Because of the comprehensive nature of Judge Pierce's analysis, it is also
clear that the principles set forth in Nikkei need not be limited to contract actions,
but might be applied with equal facility in cases involving tortious conduct.
144. It is possible that courts adopting this more systematic approach to
defining "direct effect" will have to determine the weight that is to be accorded
each criterion of the two tests in cases where all of the criteria are not satisfied. In
Nikkei this balancing is not required since all the criteria are satisfied. Were the
Nikkei test to be applied in Texas Trading, again no balancing would be necessary
since the facts in that case are virtually identical to those in Nikkei. In Verlinden,
however, or other similar cases involving a foreign plaintiff, the court could give
more weight to the interest of the plaintiff in obtaining effective relief than, for ex-
ample, to the interest of the forum in protecting its citizens and adjudicating the
dispute when determining minimum contacts. See note 124 supra and accompanying
text. In such a case, there would still remain the problem of satisfying the locus of
injury test. See note 120 and accompanying text. Likewise, in situations similar to
Nikkei, but without the unilateral amendment of the letter of credit to provide for
payment in the forum, when applying the World-Wide Volkswagen test the court
might choose to place very little emphasis upon the burden on the defendant of
litigating in the forum. The balancing of these factors, in any event, should be left to
judicial discretion.
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